工业技术经济Issue(4)：20-26,7.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1004-910X.2015.04.003
终极控制权对高管薪酬激励效应影响的实证分析
A Empirical Study of Ultimate Control Rights Influencing Incentives of Executive Compensation
摘要
Abstract
Based on the panel data of the listed companies in China's Stock Market , from the theoretical perspective of human capi-tal property rights realization , and consider the ultimate control rights , this paper empirically analyzes the effect of equity incentive for the managers . The study shows that the ultimate control rights affect the choice of executive compensation ways , the latter affects the firm per-formance , and under different control rights there are differences in firm performance between ways of executive compensation . In general , state-owned or non-state-owned company , the firm performance in equity-based incentive enterprises is better than that in no equity enterprises under low control rights , but firm performance has no significant difference between equity and no equity enterprises under high control rights .关键词
终极控制权/高管薪酬激励方式/股权激励/企业绩效Key words
ultimate control rights/ways of executive compensation/equity incentive/firm performance分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
孙永生,陈维政..终极控制权对高管薪酬激励效应影响的实证分析[J].工业技术经济,2015,(4):20-26,7.基金项目
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金（项目编号13YJA630080）；陕西省普通高校哲学社会科学特色学科建设项目“陕西纺织经济管理研究中心”和陕西高校哲学社会科学重点研究基地“纺织经济与管理研究中心”基金，陕教位［2009］6号；西安工程大学博士科研启动基金项目。 （）
