江汉大学学报（自然科学版）Issue(4)：293-296,4.DOI:10.16389/j.cnki.cn42-1737/n.2015.04.001
洪水保险的策略性定价
Strategic Pricing on Flood Insurance
摘要
Abstract
From the angle of reducing disaster ,with the theory of contract design ,to discuss the contract design of flood insurance. It is found out:when the insurer is the type of risk aversion ,even in the com⁃plete information condition ,the flood insurance contract cannot provide complete insurance to the insurer. When there are moral risk and monopoly pricing ,the insurance degree will be further distorted. On strate⁃gic pricing ,the disaster reducing efforts of the insurer are concerned with disaster rate. For reaching the non-distortion of social optimal disaster reduction ,the price by insurance company should be restricted.关键词
洪水保险/契约/激励/策略性定价Key words
flood insurance/contract/encourage/strategic pricing分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
吴秀君..洪水保险的策略性定价[J].江汉大学学报（自然科学版）,2015,(4):293-296,4.基金项目
武汉市教育局重点教研项目 （）
