天津工业大学学报Issue(3)：80-83,4.
Cournot-Bertrand双寡头动态博弈模型的复杂性分析
Complexity analysis of a master-slave Cournot-Bertrand duopoly dynamic game model
摘要
Abstract
A master-slave Cournot-Bertrand duopoly game model is presented. The two monopolists carry out the game with the expectation of bounded rationality and the upstream monopolist considers its output while the downstream monopolist considers its price. The existence of Nash equilibrium point and its local stability of the game are investigated. The complex dynamics, such as the graph of stability region, bifurcation diagrams, the maximal Lyapunov exponents diagram and strange attractor figure are displayed. It is found that equilibrium state is satisfaction to them both by analyzing the profits bifurcation diagram of the two oligarchs.关键词
主从/Cournot-Bertrand/有限理性/复杂动力学/动态博弈模型Key words
master-slave/Cournot-Bertrand/bounded rationality/complex dynamics/dynamic game model分类
数理科学引用本文复制引用
何岩岩,张芳..Cournot-Bertrand双寡头动态博弈模型的复杂性分析[J].天津工业大学学报,2014,(3):80-83,4.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目 （）
