西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）Issue(1)：40-47,8.DOI:10.15896/j.xjtuskxb.201501007
破解渠道投机的恶性循环：合同治理与关系治理权变模型
How to Break the Vicious Circle of Channel Opportunism:- A contingency framework of contract and relational governance
摘要
Abstract
Based on the theories of transaction cost,relational contract and reciprocity,we empirically examine the im-pacts of contract and relational norms on channel opportunism as well as its reciprocity.We collect the data from the an-gle of manufactures and adopt the hierarchical regression analysis,finding that suppliers′opportunist behavior aggravates manufactures′opportunist behavior (reciprocity);suppliers can not only employ either contract or relational norms to mitigate manufactures′opportunist behavior,but also simultaneously apply these two governance mechanisms to achieve better effects.However,reciprocity of channel opportunism can only be effectively weakened when contract and relational norms are both employed and the weakening effectiveness is dependent on different combinations of these two governance mechanisms.关键词
渠道投机/投机行为相互性/合同治理/关系规范Key words
channel opportunism/opportunist behavior reciprocity/contract governance/relational norms分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
周茵,庄贵军,王非..破解渠道投机的恶性循环：合同治理与关系治理权变模型[J].西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）,2015,(1):40-47,8.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目（71132005，41371180）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金青年项目 （）
