运筹与管理Issue(4)：1-11,11.
低碳供应链纵向减排合作下的政府补贴策略
Governmental Subsidy Policy for Enterprises’ Cooperative Behavior in Emission Reduction in Low-carbon Supply Chain
摘要
Abstract
To study the governmental subsidy policy in abatement cooperation in supply chain ,a game model in-cluding a government ,a retailer and a manufacturer , is set up to study the governments optimal subsidy policy and the enterprises optimal abatement inputs and profits respectively under the conditions of Nash equilibrium , Stackelberg equilibrium and concentrated decisions in supply chain .Based on this , we discuss the interaction game between government subsidies behavior and enterprises ’ cooperative behavior to choose abatement .It is shown that the abatement subsidies by government and the profits of enterprises are descent in the order of Nash equilibrium , Stackelberg equilibrium and concentrated decisions in supply chain .And we compare the differ-ences of government abatement subsidies between enterprise as a leader and as a follower in the unequal power supply chain .By further studying mutual decision between subsidy policy and forms of cooperation , we show that the optmial policy is not to provide subsidy .关键词
低碳供应链/减排合作/政府补贴/博弈论Key words
low-carbon supply chain/emission-reducing cooperation/governmental subsidy/game theory分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
李友东,赵道致,夏良杰..低碳供应链纵向减排合作下的政府补贴策略[J].运筹与管理,2014,(4):1-11,11.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目（70771073，71072155）；内蒙古大学高层次人才科研启动项目 （）
