| 注册
首页|期刊导航|运筹与管理|基于提前期压缩的供应链三方利益博弈

基于提前期压缩的供应链三方利益博弈

吕芹

运筹与管理Issue(6):128-135,143,9.
运筹与管理Issue(6):128-135,143,9.

基于提前期压缩的供应链三方利益博弈

Supply Chain Revenue Game Based on Lead-time Compression Among Three Parties

吕芹1

作者信息

  • 1. 上海大学 悉尼工商学院,上海 201800
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

A revenue coordination problem of the supply chain based on lead-time compression is discussed .The supplier implements a lot-partitioning supply model and the 3PL undertakes the delivery .The members of the supply chain gain the lead-time compression by lead-time crashing .Based on stackelberg game model , a decision principle is designed to compare the cost savings of the buyer , the supplier, the 3PL and the system.A best way is chosen according to the decision principle .A simulation analysis is given to show the effect of the variety of the relative parameters on decision variables and savings of the cost of the manufacturer , 3 PL, the supplier and total system.It can be concluded that mode A and mode D are much preferred and when the unit inventory cost of the buyer is higher , the cost savings on each party fluctuates greatly .The validity of the method of game decision based on lead-time compression is demonstrated via it .

关键词

供应链管理/决策原则/斯坦克尔伯格博弈/第三方物流/提前期压缩

Key words

supply chain management/decision principle/stackelberg game/third-party logistics/lead-time reduction

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

吕芹..基于提前期压缩的供应链三方利益博弈[J].运筹与管理,2014,(6):128-135,143,9.

基金项目

国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772077);上海市高校青年教师培养资助计划项目 ()

运筹与管理

OA北大核心CHSSCDCSCDCSSCICSTPCD

1007-3221

访问量0
|
下载量0
段落导航相关论文