运筹与管理Issue(3)：27-34,8.
促销努力成本信息不对称下供应链回购契约
Design for Supply Chain Contract with Asymmetric lnformation on Promotional Effort Cost
摘要
Abstract
We consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer, in which the customer’ s demand is hypothesized to be influenced by retailer’s promotional effort.Before the selling season, the retailer needs to de-cide his quantity and his effort level according to the effort cost and the revenue.Based on principal-agent theo-ry, this paper studies how to design the buy-back contract and the revenue-sharing contract when the effort cost information can not be observed.The results of the study show that under asymmetric information, in the buy-back contract the supplier and the retailer’ s best decisions are as the same as those in the revenue-sharing con-tract.Asymmetric information results in efficiency, the retailer’ s best order quantities and the promotional effort level are lower than those under the centralized decision, and only the result with Pareto efficiency is gained which is inferior to optimization.关键词
信息不对称/信息租金/回购契约/促销努力Key words
asymmetry information/buy-back contract/revenue-sharing contract/promotional effort分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
肖群,马士华..促销努力成本信息不对称下供应链回购契约[J].运筹与管理,2015,(3):27-34,8.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71472069，71362016）；云南省教育厅基金资助项目 （）
