中国工程科学Issue(10)：77-83,7.
依赖特许收益的PPP项目补偿契约激励性与有效性
Incentive and validity of compensation contract for PPP project depending on concession income
摘要
Abstract
In consideration of the uncertainty of public private partnership(PPP)project ben-efit,firstly a relative index to describe the operating compensation for the project is introduced to design a single period compensation contract based on the government’s need. Then based on the fact that the private investment variable can’t be included in the contract,a game model between the public and private sector is proposed to explore the contact’s optimal form,incen-tive effect and valid condition respectively from the centralized and disperse decision-making. The research results show that the obtained optimal contract can encourage the private investor to choose the same optimal investment scale as the government’s centralized decision-making, and share both risks and revenues with the government. However,the valid compensation must satisfy the project’s social welfare constraint,which implies the valid compensation should be adapted to different actual scenes for PPP project.关键词
PPP项目/特许收益/单期补偿/激励性/有效性Key words
PPP project/concession income/single period compensation/incentive/validi-ty分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
吴孝灵,周晶,王冀宁,彭以忱..依赖特许收益的PPP项目补偿契约激励性与有效性[J].中国工程科学,2014,(10):77-83,7.基金项目
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70831002）；国家自然科学基金项目(71173103，71271112，71301070，71301073）；中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2012M521053）；江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目(2012SJB630029）；国家社科基金重大招标项目(12&ZD24） （）
