湖南工业大学学报Issue(6)：58-64,7.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1673-9833.2014.06.012
不对称信息下的导游服务外包激励机制设计
Design of Incentive Mechanism for Tour-Guide Service Outsourcing Under Asymmetric Information
摘要
Abstract
In view of the problem of tour-guide service providers' moral hazard caused by asymmetric information in the tour-guide service outsourcing, designs the incentive mechanism for tour-guide service outsourcing based on the contract-issuing party participation and the principle-agent relationship between travel agency and tour-guide service provider. By analyzing the models of asymmetric information and information symmetry, discusses the incentive contract parameters of tour-guide service outsourcing and the optimal effort level relative factors of tour-guide service provider and travel agency. The results show that under asymmetric information, the effort level of tour-guide service provider and travel agency not only are affected by their own factors such as service capacity constraints but also are affected by other side factors and the uncertainty of tourism market. The tour-guide service provider with high service ability and willingness to undertake risks and responsibilities will get more earnings.关键词
导游服务外包/委托- 代理关系/激励机制/信息不对称Key words
tour guide service outsourcing/principle-agent relationship/incentive mechanism/asymmetric information分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
章江顺,鲁芳,罗定提..不对称信息下的导游服务外包激励机制设计[J].湖南工业大学学报,2014,(6):58-64,7.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71201053），湖南工业大学研究生创新基金资助项目 （）
