运筹与管理Issue(2)：64-71,8.
闭环供应链竞争的博弈分析与链内协调合同设计
Game Analysis of Closed-loop Supply Chain Competition and Coordinative Contract Design Within Supply Chain
摘要
Abstract
We assume that the manufacturer entrusts the retailer to reclaim used products for remanufacturing . This paper studies the competition between two closed -loop supply chains (CLSCs)and coordination within one SC, where each SC consists of one manufacturer and one retailer .With game theory and equilibrium analysis method, an EPEC(Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constrains )model, a Nash equilibrium model and a MPEC(Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constrains ) model are set up respectively to characterize the competition between two decentralized CLSCs , two centralized CLSCs, one decentralized CLSC and one central-ized CLSC.The solutions of these models are put forward .Based on contract theory, a wholesale price plus re-covery subsidy contract is put forward , which can coordinate retailer’s retail price and recovery price decisions under the situation of SC competition .A numerical example validates the rationality of models and the validity of the contract mentioned above.The results of study show that the retail price and demand will increase when the substitution effect of products increases ; the more sensitive of consumers to recovery prices , the more recovery quantity and the profit of supply chain ; SC coordination is dominative strategy under the situation of SC competi -tion, which can improve the efficiency of supply chain operation , but the competition between two coordinative supply chains is so fierce that the phenomenon of Prisoners Trap exists .关键词
闭环供应链/供应链竞争/供应链协调/博弈论/均衡分析方法Key words
closed-loop supply chain/supply chain competition/supply chain coordination/game theory/equi-librium analysis method分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
徐兵,杨金梅..闭环供应链竞争的博弈分析与链内协调合同设计[J].运筹与管理,2013,(2):64-71,8.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目（ NSFC70961006）；中国博士后基金（20100481186）；中国博士后科学基金特别资助项目 （）
