运筹与管理2016，Vol.25Issue(1)：8-14,7.DOI:10.12005/orms.2016.0002
信息不对称下制造商填塞分销渠道策略研究
Manufacturer’ s Channel Stuffing Strategies under Information Asymmetry
摘要
Abstract
In a two-stage supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer , the manufacturer manager may maximize his own utility through channel stuffing strategy .This paper investigates the effect of channel stuffing decisions on the supply chain performance under information asymmetry and finds that as the investors correcting finical reports increase , the inventory level as well as the manufacturer manager ’ s utility decrease .When the manager pays more attention to market value , the manufacturer ’ s profit decreases which indicates channel stuff-ing has a negative effect on the manufacturer ’ s real value .Meanwhile , the profit of the total supply chain is affected by the manager ’ s channel stuffing decision as well as other external factors such as retail price .Moreo-ver, strengthening external supervision and designing a reasonable incentive scheme help to reduce managers ’ channel stuffing behaviors .关键词
供应链绩效/填塞分销渠道/信息不对称/经理人股票期权Key words
supply chain performance/channel stuffing/information asymmetry/executive stock option分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
李建斌,王启飞,胡威..信息不对称下制造商填塞分销渠道策略研究[J].运筹与管理,2016,25(1):8-14,7.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71171088，70901029，71131004，71202162）；中央高校基本科研业务专项基金（HUSTCXY12M013，2014YQ002；65011451），教育部新世纪优秀人才项目NCET-13-0228 （）
