经济数学2016，Vol.33Issue(1)：93-99,7.
具有质量安全惩罚主导权零售商与供应商的食品安全检测决策
Analysis on the Retailer with the Dominant Right of the Quality Safety Penalty and Supplier’s Decisions of Food Safety Inspection
摘要
Abstract
The optimal model on the food quality safety inspection level of a retailer with the dominant right of the quali-ty safety penalty and a supplier was built to analyze the decisions of the quality and safety inspection level in the modes of inde-pendent dispersion and cooperative integration for the test of food safety and quality.And the influence of the retailer’s quality safety penalty amount for the supplier on the inspection level was discussed.The main conclusion shows that,when the quality safety penalty amount from the supplier to the retailer is relative higher,the quality safety inspection level of the supplier and the retailer would increase by the penalty amount.Finally,the countermeasures were provided in order to strengthen the food quality safety inspection in China.关键词
食品安全/检测水平/质量安全惩罚/决策分析Key words
food safety/inspection level/quality safety penalty/decision analysis分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
费威..具有质量安全惩罚主导权零售商与供应商的食品安全检测决策[J].经济数学,2016,33(1):93-99,7.基金项目
国家社会科学基金项目(14CGL040) （14CGL040）
省社科联2016年度辽宁经济社会发展立项课题(2016lslktjjx-08) （2016lslktjjx-08）
大连市社科联2015-2016年度重点课题(2015dlskzd054) （2015dlskzd054）
东北财经大学优秀科研创新人才项目(DUFE2015R01) （DUFE2015R01）
