运筹与管理2016，Vol.25Issue(2)：40-48,9.DOI:10.12005/orms.2016.0042
CVaR 准则下两条供应链的促销努力竞争与链内协调研究
Order and Sale-promotion Competition Between Two SCs and Coordination Within SC Based on CVaR Criterion
摘要
Abstract
This paper studies the effet of the decision-maker ’ s risk-aversion degree and the problem of supply chain( SC) coordination when two SCs compete each other.Considering two SCs competition in order-quantity and sale-promotion, where each SC consists of one risk-neutral manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer and of-fers one kind substitutable products, this paper sets up EPEC ( Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Con-strains) , Nash and MPEC ( Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constrains) decision models to respectively characterize the competition between two decentralized SCs ( DD mode ) or two centralized SCs ( II mode ) or one decentralized SC and one centralized SC( DI mode) by using CVaR method and game theory.The equilibrium de-cisions under three modes are obtained.One buy-back plus promotion subsidy contract is put forward to coordi-nate one single SC with risk-averse retailer.Furthernore, supply chain competition is studied when retailers are risk-neutral.The example demonstrates the reasonability of the proposed models and feasibility of the coordina-tive contracts.The study shows that the higher retailer’ s sale-promotion is, the less he orders.The higher the ratio of qualified products is, the more the retailer’ s sale-promotion is.SC coordination is one dominant strategy under SC competition.关键词
供应链竞争/博弈论/条件风险值/带均衡约束的均衡问题/回购加促销补贴契约Key words
supply chain competition/game theory/conditional value-at-risk ( CVaR )/equilibrium problems with equilibrium constrains/buy-back plus promotion subsidy contract分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
徐兵,刘露,贾艳丽..CVaR 准则下两条供应链的促销努力竞争与链内协调研究[J].运筹与管理,2016,25(2):40-48,9.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目（71561018，71502076）；南昌大学江西发展升级推进长江经济带建设协同创新中心应急项目《大力发展我省绿色产品的调研报告》资助 （）
