铁道科学与工程学报2016，Vol.13Issue(5)：1000-1006,7.
碳交易机制下存在冲突行为的供应链协调研究
Supply chain coordination under carbon trading mechanis m in case of conflict
摘要
Abstract
This paper studied the coordination of the conflicting two-echeon low carbon supply chain consisting of upstream and downstream manufacturers.The conflict was defined that the upstream manufacturer takes action for carbon emissions reduction under carbon trading mechanism while the downstream manufacturer's production cost rises.It assumed for the Stackelberg game that the upstream manufacturer plays as a leader and the down-stream manufacturer does as a follower.Four kinds of situation of decentralized decision making,centralized de-cision-making,the production cost sharing contract and the carbon emissions reduction revenue sharing contract under decentralized decision making were considered and the way of backward induction was used to solve.The results show that the more intense the conflict is,the lower the efficiency of carbon emissions reduction is and the higher the retail price is.The optimal investment of the decentralized supply chain under the two contracts is un-changed and still lower than that of the centralized supply chain.The participation constraint and incentive com-patibility constraint cannot achieve with the single production cost sharing contract or the carbon emissions reduc-tion revenue sharing contract.The root cause is that the sharing cost or carbon emissions reduction sharing reve-nue will transfer through the wholesale price mechanism.Therefore,it is difficult to coordinate for this supply chain.关键词
碳减排/冲突行为/供应链协调Key words
Carbon emissions reduction/conflict/supply chain coordination分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
蔡立燕,刘俊,王傅强..碳交易机制下存在冲突行为的供应链协调研究[J].铁道科学与工程学报,2016,13(5):1000-1006,7.基金项目
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关资助项目（10JZD0020）；国家自然科学基金重点资助项目（71431006）；中国博士后基金资助项目 （）
