上海城市规划Issue(2)：8-14,7.
城市工业园区存量更新中的利益博弈与治理创新*--深圳、常州高新区两种模式的比较
Benefit Game and Governance Innovation in Inventory Land Regeneration of Urban Industrial Parks:Based on Pattern Comparisonbetween Shenzhen and Changzhou National Hi-tech District
摘要
Abstract
With the transformation of national economy and the adjustment of industrial structure, the development of urban industrial parks in China has gradually stepped into the era of exploiting inventory potential under the background of increasingly strict land control, thus producing large numbers of industrial land regeneration activities. As the combined logic of capital and power is behind physical space, continuous gaming concentrating on space is also behind land redevelopment, the key and dififculty point of which is to balance rights and interests of stakeholders. However, in the current institutional environment, redevelopment gaming is often restricted by property right system and gaming imbalance, redevelopment work facing the lose-lose dilemma. Starting from the basic mechanisms of spatial gaming, the in-depth contradictions hindering the inventory redevelopment of urban industrial parks is discussed in this study. An ideal gaming model based on value equilibrium is constructed to speciifcally analyze two governance modes ofShenzhen and Changzhounationalhigh-tech zones and then point out the main problems as well as future institutional innovation orientation. The study shows that the inventory redevelopment of urban industrial land is cooperative spatial gaming in essence, ownership adjustment and balanced value distribution of which are the key to reaching cooperative agreement and realizing gaming equilibrium. For urban industrial parks in general areas, policy system suitable for industrial land redevelopment and positively-involved catalytic projects can be carried out to achieve the decrease of transaction cost and the improvement of.关键词
工业园区/存量更新/空间利益/合作博弈/治理创新Key words
Industrial park/Inventory land regeneration/Interests of space/Cooperative game/Governance innovation分类
建筑与水利引用本文复制引用
姜克芳,张京祥..城市工业园区存量更新中的利益博弈与治理创新*--深圳、常州高新区两种模式的比较[J].上海城市规划,2016,(2):8-14,7.基金项目
国家自然科学基金课题“基于精明收缩的城市工业园区转型再生研究”（No.51578276）资助。 （）
