运筹与管理Issue(4)：20-25,6.
矿山环境恢复治理保证金制度中公众参与的博弈分析：基于合谋与防范的视角
Game Analysis of Public Participation in Mine Rehabilitation Deposit System:Based on the Perspective of Conspiracy and Prevention
摘要
Abstract
Mineral explorations can cause the deterioration of ecological environment .At home and abroad , the mine rehabilitation deposit system has been set up to compel the mining enterprises to take charge of a series of restoration tasks for mining area ecological environment .However , during the implementing process of this sys-tem, it is prone to moral hazard without public supervision , which is the conspiracy behavior between the mining enterprises and local government supervisors .At present , the mine rehabilitation deposit system in China does not include the content of public participation , whose defection needs to be supplemented and revised .This pa-per has established a tripartite game model of public , mining enterprises and the local government supervisor based on the game theory .According to the equilibrium results of the game model , this research results are that the conspiracy can be prevented and controlled by improving the probability of public supervision and the proba -bility of effective public supervision , and reducing the cost of public supervision .Finally, it has put forward sev-eral corresponding policy recommendations .关键词
生态补偿/矿山环境恢复治理/保证金制度/混合策略纳什均衡/公众参与/合谋行为Key words
ecological compensation/mine environment restoration and control/deposit system/mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium/public participation/conspiracy分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
徐大伟,杨娜,张雯..矿山环境恢复治理保证金制度中公众参与的博弈分析：基于合谋与防范的视角[J].运筹与管理,2013,(4):20-25,6.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目（70973013，71273038）；教育部哲学社会科学研究后期资助项目（11JHQ031）；辽宁省财政科研基金项目（12c004）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金 （）
