广西师范大学学报（自然科学版）2016，Vol.34Issue(2)：1-7,7.DOI:10.16088/j.issn.1001-6600.2016.02.001
多数者博弈模型演化分析
Evolutionary Analysis of the Maj ority Game
摘要
Abstract
In order to study the influence of agents’action strategies on the evolution of social economic system,the basic majority game and the evolutionary majority game in which agents prefer to stay in the majority are put forward on the basis of minority game.We build agent-based models,all the agents in the model are given bounded rationality,and they use their best strategy or modify their strategy probility each round in order to compete for finite resources.When evolving to stable state,phenomena which are unique to human society also occur.In the basic minority game,if agents in the maj ority are ruled winners,we get the basic maj ority game,and the game has higher resources utilization when the dimension of the strategy space,m,is smaller.As m gets larger,the utilization becomes lower, approaching that of the random choice game finally.While the utilization of evolutionary maj ority game isn’t affected by m,so,when m in the game is larger,the evolution is so perferable to improve the utilization of the system.With the same parameters in the game,different random initial conditions may cause different side of distribution of P(p)at p=0.5.The average number of winners each round is also found to be related to the distribution of P(p)at the same time.If we use different boundary conditions to reset agents’strategy probabilities,we will also get different distribution of P (p ).For further analysis of evolutionary maj ority game’s utilization,we find that the lager the parameter r which means the relation between agents’old and new p,the flatter distribution of P(p)is,and the utilization also gets larger.At last,if we improve R representing the value of the prize-to-fine ratio,the distribution of P(p)will also be affected,resulted to a lager utilization of the game.关键词
行为策略/少数者博弈模型/基本多数者博弈模型/演化多数者博弈模型/有限理性Key words
action strategies/minority game/basic maj ority game/evolutionary maj ority game/bounded rationality分类
物理学引用本文复制引用
孙康,全宏俊..多数者博弈模型演化分析[J].广西师范大学学报（自然科学版）,2016,34(2):1-7,7.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目(11174083) （11174083）
