电力系统自动化2016，Vol.40Issue(15)：25-31,7.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20150706001
燃料市场对采用不同能源和技术的发电集团博弈策略影响
Impact of Fuel Market on Strategy Behaviors of Generation Groups with Different Energies and Technologies
卢永 1甘德强 2刘广一 1John N.JIANG3
作者信息
- 1. 浙江大学电气工程学院，浙江省杭州市 310027
- 2. 俄克拉荷马大学电力与计算机学院，俄克拉荷马州诺曼市 73019，美国
- 3. 全球能源互联网美国研究院，Santa Clara，CA 95054，美国
- 折叠
摘要
Abstract
In the deregulated market environment , there exists a game relationship between the upstream fuel market and the downstream electricity producers . From the long‐term point of view , this kind of game relationship reflects the development trend of each main market player and clarifying the relationship can provide some scientific support for drafting rational policies . The clarification process may be easy under the ideal conditions without any capacity constraints , while the game relationship will become very complicated with capacity constraints . A game theory based model is thus built to represent interactions between upstream fuel market and downstream electricity market , in which different generation technologies are taken into consideration . With the model , the impacts of fuel price on the strategy behaviors of generation groups are analyzed through mathematical analysis and simulations in order to understand the possible changes of strategy behaviors when there is a binding constraint on electricity production . The results show how market participants may choose their optimal strategies in response to the fuel price and their rivals actions . Moreover , it is shown that a binding capacity will make the interactions between the fuel producers and the electricity producers more complicated , where the equilibrium will break down into multi ‐strategy equilibria .关键词
博弈论/电力市场/燃料市场/策略行为/容量约束/电力监管/可再生能源/负荷响应/发电技术Key words
game theory/electricity market/fuel market/strategy behavior/capacity constraint/electricity regulation/renewable energy/load demand response/generation technologies引用本文复制引用
卢永,甘德强,刘广一,John N.JIANG..燃料市场对采用不同能源和技术的发电集团博弈策略影响[J].电力系统自动化,2016,40(15):25-31,7.
