财经理论与实践2016，Vol.37Issue(4)：105-110,6.
产品市场竞争、管理层权力与薪酬辩护
Product Market Competition,Managerial Power and Compensation Justification
王东清 1刘艳辉1
作者信息
- 1. 中南大学 商学院，湖南 长沙 410083
- 折叠
摘要
Abstract
Based on the samples of listed companies in China from 201 1 to 2014,this paper in-vestigates the impact of managerial power on pay for performance sensitivity and the impact of su-pervision under product market competition from the perspective of compensation justification. The main empirical results indicate that when corporate top managers use their power to get ex-cess compensation and seek their own interests,they will also increase the pay for performance sensitivity to justify the reasonability of compensation,and present a reasonable and effective compensation contract.Product market competition can inhibit top managers'behavior of compen-sation justification significantly,and then reduce the impact and distortion on compensation con-tract under managerial power.关键词
管理层权力/超额薪酬/薪酬-业绩敏感性/薪酬辩护/产品市场竞争Key words
Managerial power/Excess compensation/Pay for performance sensitivity/Com-pensation justification/Product market competition分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
王东清,刘艳辉..产品市场竞争、管理层权力与薪酬辩护[J].财经理论与实践,2016,37(4):105-110,6.
