经济与管理研究2016，Vol.37Issue(10)：91-99,9.DOI:10.13502/j.cnki.issn1000-7636.2016.10.011
国有企业高管在职消费监管：理论与经验证据
Supervising Perquisite Consumption of Executives in State-owned Companies:Theory and Evidence
摘要
Abstract
Supervising perquisite consumption of executives in state-owned companies during the new round of reform is of especial importance,which is supported theoretically and empirically in this paper.Perquisite consumption is taken as an important alternative incentive of monetary compensation in Chinese companies.However,how actually is the incentive effect and why should the supervision be tightened?This paper,from the perspective of informal enforcement of contract, proposes a new theoretical explanation that perquisite consumption is informal an incentive realized through relational contract between owners and management.Features of self-enforcement and unverification by the third party result in high level perquisite consumption with weak incentive effect.Afterwards,this paper uses the data of listed companies in China to test the weak incentive effect of perquisite consumption with systematic generalized method of moments,which further proves the hypothesis.关键词
在职消费/关系契约/系统广义矩估计法Key words
perquisite consumption/relational contract/sys-GMM分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
田妮,张宗益..国有企业高管在职消费监管：理论与经验证据[J].经济与管理研究,2016,37(10):91-99,9.基金项目
国家杰出青年科学基金项目“中国公司治理理论与实证研究” （）
