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低碳项目开发商群体演化博弈与政府激励∗

王华 仇欣欣

沈阳工业大学学报(社会科学版)2016,Vol.9Issue(5):439-442,4.
沈阳工业大学学报(社会科学版)2016,Vol.9Issue(5):439-442,4.DOI:10.7688/j.issn.1674-0823.2016.05.10

低碳项目开发商群体演化博弈与政府激励∗

Evolutionary game of developers and government incentives on low carbon projects

王华 1仇欣欣1

作者信息

  • 1. 沈阳工业大学 管理学院,沈阳110870
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

The problem of higher energy consumption is aimed at in current engineering projects. The stakeholders of low carbon project construction are analyzed, such as governments and developers. Based on the theory and method of evolutionary game, the indicators are selected such as low carbon earnings of developers, and development costs, etc. The evolution game analysis are conducted of the government to the developers on the low carbon project construction. The orientation of government incentive to expand low carbon projects construction in China is proposed, and the relevant policy recommendations are offered, so as to provide reference for policy making of low carbon project construction market.

关键词

低碳项目/开发商/演化博弈/政府激励

Key words

low carbon project/developer/evolutionary game/government incentive

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

王华,仇欣欣..低碳项目开发商群体演化博弈与政府激励∗[J].沈阳工业大学学报(社会科学版),2016,9(5):439-442,4.

基金项目

辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目(L14AJY007)。 (L14AJY007)

沈阳工业大学学报(社会科学版)

OACHSSCD

1674-0823

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