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基于静态非合作博弈的电动汽车充电电价影响因素量化分析

孙丙香 阮海军 许文中 姜久春 龚敏明

电工技术学报2016,Vol.31Issue(21):75-85,11.
电工技术学报2016,Vol.31Issue(21):75-85,11.

基于静态非合作博弈的电动汽车充电电价影响因素量化分析

Quantitative Analysis of Influence Factors about EV’ s Charging Electricity Price Based on the Static Non-Cooperative Game Theory

孙丙香 1阮海军 2许文中 1姜久春 2龚敏明1

作者信息

  • 1. 国家能源主动配电网技术研发中心 北京交通大学 北京 100044
  • 2. 北京交通大学北京电动车辆协同创新中心 北京 100044
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

The forthcoming mass popularization and application of electric vehicles(EVs)would prompt the urgent requirement of reasonable charging electricity price. Game theory is used to analyze the interests relationship of the main three players to the EV’ s development including the government, the charging infrastructure operator and the users. Then, the tripartite game model about the charging electricity price and holdings of EVs is built and gets classical solution on the basis of static non-cooperative game. Focusing on EV’ s data of nine cities in the Pearl River Delta, the game equilibrium solutions are obtained based on charging infrastructure operator or the government as the leading party respectively. Moreover, the variations of charging electricity price, EVs holdings and the sensitive degree of five influence factors are quantitatively calculated. Ultimately considering the acquired appropriate subsidies of charging infrastructure for the operator offered by government, the accepted game equilibrium solution for both players is produced and the generalized cost of the user is analyzed, which can satisfy the interests of three players. It is beneficial to large-scale proliferation of EVs.

关键词

电动汽车保有量/充电电价/静态非合作博弈

Key words

Electricity vehicle holdings/charging electricity price/static non-cooperative game

分类

信息技术与安全科学

引用本文复制引用

孙丙香,阮海军,许文中,姜久春,龚敏明..基于静态非合作博弈的电动汽车充电电价影响因素量化分析[J].电工技术学报,2016,31(21):75-85,11.

基金项目

国家电网公司科技资助项目(E15L00190)。 (E15L00190)

电工技术学报

OA北大核心CSCDCSTPCD

1000-6753

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