重庆工商大学学报（自然科学版）2016，Vol.33Issue(6)：79-84,6.DOI:10.16055/j.issn.1672-058X.2016.0006.016
技术研发联盟关系性资产投入的股权激励机制研究∗
Study on Equity Incentive Mechanism for Relational Assets Investment of R & D Alliance
摘要
Abstract
Because of the constraints such as the information asymmetry, bounded rationality and so on in technology R&D alliances, the contract between the alliance members is not a complete contract and this kind of incomplete contract leads to the opportunism behaviors in the alliance members so that relational assets investment is reduced.This paper analyzes that the alliance members share the alliance interests by holding equities to form bilateral dependence relation in order to promote the incentive compatibility between the alliance members. By setting up the equity incentive mechanism model between an alliance leader and alliance members, the optimal relational assets investment and the optimal equity are obtained by solving the model. The effect of the relevant parameters on the relational assets investment and equity incentive is also analyzed, and finally, the related suggestions are given.关键词
研发联盟/契约不完全/关系性资产/股权激励Key words
R & D alliance/incomplete contract/relational assets/equity incentive分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
姜山水,徐浩..技术研发联盟关系性资产投入的股权激励机制研究∗[J].重庆工商大学学报（自然科学版）,2016,33(6):79-84,6.基金项目
国家自然科学基金（70972143）；重庆市科委前沿与应用基础研究一般项目（ CSTC2014JCYJA00050）． （）
