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信息不对称下企业投机行为的演化博弈分析

顾倩倩

管理观察Issue(31):29-31,35,4.
管理观察Issue(31):29-31,35,4.

信息不对称下企业投机行为的演化博弈分析

Speculative Behavior of Enterprise Based on Evolutionary Game Analysis under Information Asymmetry

顾倩倩1

作者信息

  • 1. 上海师范大学天华学院,上海 201815
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

In this paper,the evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the dynamic trend and stability of the strategic behavior during the interaction between regulatory authorities and production enterprises. The study found that the factors influencing the game behavior would affect the stability of the interaction system equilibrium. The analysis showed that if the enterprises can obtain too high income from speculative behavior, or the supervision degree of the supervision department was low,or other factors,the system may evolve to the poor state,and keep stability in this kind of state. At the same time,this paper also discuss the conditions of the system evolving to a good state,and put forward relevant policy suggestions for the managers.

关键词

信息不对称/投机行为/演化博弈/复制动态/政策建议

Key words

Speculative behavior/Evolutionary game/Duplicative dynamic/Evolutionary stable strategy/Information asymmetry

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

顾倩倩..信息不对称下企业投机行为的演化博弈分析[J].管理观察,2016,(31):29-31,35,4.

管理观察

OACHSSCD

1674-2877

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