经济与管理研究2016，Vol.37Issue(12)：37-44,8.DOI:10.13502/j.cnki.issn1000-7636.2016.12.005
Research on Economics and Management
Executives' Salary Control of State-owned Enterprises Based on Internal Performance and Market Value
摘要
Abstract
By designing the comprehensive indexes of internal performance and market value with the factor analysis method based on A-share listed companies' data,this paper combines the executives' salary index with the comprehensive index to create a performance-salary index.Next,by comparing the comprehensive index between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises,it concludes that it is necessary to control salary in state-owned enterprises.Then,the salary control should accord with the market value created by executives.If the difference between the actual operating results and market valuation is large,the gap between the result of executive operation and market expectation will be big.By constructing the model of which internal performance and market value influence executive salary,this paper concludes that market value has a negative effect on executive salary,so market value index can be an instruction for salary controlling.关键词
薪酬管控/内部绩效/市场价值/国有企业Key words
salary control/internal performance/market value/state-owned enterprise分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
徐炜,曹腾飞..Research on Economics and Management[J].经济与管理研究,2016,37(12):37-44,8.基金项目
国家社会科学基金重点项目“深化国有企业改革问题研究” （）
