土木工程与管理学报2016，Vol.33Issue(6)：94-98,108,6.
房地产经纪机构失信应对的演化博弈
Countermeasures to Real Estate Brokerage Agencies Dishonesty Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
摘要
Abstract
By using the evolutionary game theory,this article analyzed the evolution paths of the real estate brokerage agencies’discredit,and discussed the strategies of evolutionary equilibrium between the real estate brokerage agencies and consumers before and after information transmission. By evolutionary game model,we found that after consumers finishing transactions,the information transmission can restrain real estate brokerage agencies ’ discredit,however,if consumers can’t transmit information effectively-regardless of various supervision-the real estate brokerage agencies will also certainly tend to perform discredit;only information be transmitted widely,the real estate brokerage agencies’opportunistic benefits and the cost of information transmission can be reduced. Finally,this article put forward three suggestions to improve the effect of dealing with the real estate brokerage agencies’discredit:first,establish trading evaluation mechanism on consumers and the real estate brokerage agencies;second,disclose trading evaluation information in the existing credit platform;third,use the Internet to widely transmit transaction information.关键词
房地产经纪机构/演化博弈/失信/监督Key words
real estate brokerage agency/evolutionary game theory/dishonesty/supervision分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
安春晓,付光辉..房地产经纪机构失信应对的演化博弈[J].土木工程与管理学报,2016,33(6):94-98,108,6.基金项目
2013年江苏省建设系统科技项目 （）
