经济与管理研究2017，Vol.38Issue(2)：34-43,10.DOI:10.13502/j.cnki.issn1000-7636.2017.02.004
制度逻辑、金字塔层级与国有企业决策偏好
Institutional Logic,Pyramid Level and Decision Preference of State-owned Enterprises
摘要
Abstract
Selecting the data of Chinese state-owned listed companies,this paper analyzes the managers’ decision preference based on different institutional logic under different pyramid levels and its effects on firm performance.The results show that:managers’ decision behavior is based on administrative logic under the low pyramid level and based on economic logic under the high pyramid level.Specifically,the results indicate that overinvestment has a negative effect on firm performance under the low pyramid level and has a positive effect under the high pyramid level.The boards’ monitoring intensity will negatively moderate the effect between overinvestment and firm performance.The moderating effect is not significant under the low pyramid because of the government’s excessive intervention,which indicates that the government’s excessive intervention will lead to the failure of board monitoring.关键词
制度逻辑/金字塔层级/行政逻辑/经济逻辑/董事会监督强度Key words
institutional logic/pyramid level/administrative logic/economic logic/boards’ monitoring intensity分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
武立东,薛坤坤,王凯..制度逻辑、金字塔层级与国有企业决策偏好[J].经济与管理研究,2017,38(2):34-43,10.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目“混和所有制企业中的竞争性制度逻辑、多重冲突与治理机制研究”（71572085）；教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“转型企业集团成长模式及治理机制研究”（13JJD630005），“混合所有制企业治理问题研究” （）
