经济与管理研究2017，Vol.38Issue(2)：44-50,7.DOI:10.13502/j.cnki.issn1000-7636.2017.02.005
国有企业混合所有制改造中股东间利益博弈分析
The Game Analysis of Shareholders’ Interests in the Mixed Ownership Reform of State-owned Enterprises
摘要
Abstract
This paper establishes a tripartite game model of state-owned shareholders,non-state shareholders and regulators,based on the mixed ownership reform in state-owned enterprises equity main conflicts of interest,and explores the different subjects’ interaction between interests game.The research suggests that:the probability of state-owned shareholders encroaching on non-state shareholders’ interests is affected by the appeal cost of non-state shareholders,the benefits of embezzlement that regulators can obtain,the probability that regulators can find out this behavior;the definition of occupation ratio range that state-owned shareholders encroach on non-state shareholders influences the reform pace of state-owned enterprises.关键词
国有企业/混合所有制/利益关系/博弈Key words
state-owned enterprises/mixed ownership/interest relationship/game theory分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
李东升,姚娜娜,余振红..国有企业混合所有制改造中股东间利益博弈分析[J].经济与管理研究,2017,38(2):44-50,7.基金项目
国家社会科学基金项目“我国大型国有企业混合所有制改造中的利益机制重构及其有效治理模式研究”（14BGL051）；山东省社会科学规划项目“山东国有煤炭企业混合所有制改造中不同产权主体利益协调机制研究” （）
