运筹与管理2016，Vol.25Issue(6)：34-38,5.DOI:10.12005/orms.2016.0198
基于合作博弈的组装供应链转移定价策略
Transfer Pricing Strategy in an Asse mbly Supply Chain Based on Cooperative Ga me Analysis
摘要
Abstract
The transfer pricing decision for a integrated assembly system with n upstream suppliers and a down-stream assembler is considered,where the upstream suppliers sell n complementary components to a downstream assembler,then the downstream assembler sell products to the market.The downstream division faces a price-sen-sitive deterministic demand.The n upstream suppliers can independently determine their retail prices to the down-stream assembler,and decide whether or not they will sell to the downstream assembler at negotiated transfer prices.Each supplier and assembler have the freedom to decide whether to cooperate with each other.The results show that the profit of the assembly system is the highest in the grand coalition structure.To allocate the system-wide profit between upstream suppliers and downstream assembler,we construct a cooperative game,show the supermodular of the game,and then compute the Shapley value-based transfer prices for the assembly system.关键词
组装供应链/转移价格/合作博弈/核/Shapley值Key words
assembly supply chain/transfer price/cooperative game/core/Shapley value分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
李昌文,周永务,卓翔芝,肖旦..基于合作博弈的组装供应链转移定价策略[J].运筹与管理,2016,25(6):34-38,5.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71520107001，7151077）；教育部人文社科青年资助项目（15YJC630053，16YJA630003）；安徽省高校省级自然科学研究重点项目 （）
