西安电子科技大学学报（自然科学版）2017，Vol.44Issue(1)：119-124,6.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1001-2400.2017.01.021
对 PRINCE分组密码的不可能差分攻击
Impossible differential cryptanalysis on the PRINCE
摘要
Abstract
The PRINCE is a light‐weight block cipher with the 64‐bit block size and 128‐bit key size . It is characterized by low power‐consumption and low latency . PRINCEcore is the PRINCE cipher without key‐whiting . For evaluating its security , a statistical testing on linear transformation is performed , and a statistical character matrix is given . By using the �miss‐in‐the‐middle" technique , we construct a 5‐round impossible differential characteristic . Based on the 5‐round distinguisher , a 9‐round attack on the PRINCEcore is performed . For the 9‐round attack , the data complexity , time complexity and space complexity are 261.2 , 254.3 and 217.7 , respectively . The testing result shows that the PRINCEcore reduced to 9 rounds is not immune to impossible differential attack .关键词
分组密码/不可能差分攻击/PRINCE密码/攻击复杂度Key words
block cipher/impossible differential attack/PRINCE/attack complexity分类
信息技术与安全科学引用本文复制引用
魏悦川,潘晓中,戎宜生,王绪安..对 PRINCE分组密码的不可能差分攻击[J].西安电子科技大学学报（自然科学版）,2017,44(1):119-124,6.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目（61202492）；信息保障技术重点实验室开放课题资助项目（KJ-15-010）；陕西省自然科学基础研究计划资助项目 （）
