运筹与管理2017，Vol.26Issue(2)：57-67,11.DOI:10.12005/orms.2017.0033
供应商成本信息不对称下装配系统协同问题研究
Research on Coordination Problem of Assembly Systemwith Asymmetric Supplier's Cost Information
摘要
Abstract
We take an assembly system consisting of two suppliers and one manufacturer as the research object, wherein one of the suppliers has private cost information, and the manufacturer reveals this private information through designing contract.As the channel master in the assembly system, the manufacturer aims to maximize its profit on the one hand, and on the other hand, it looks forward to gain more profit through channel coordination.The result shows that when the manufacturer offers wholesale price contracts to both the two suppliers, it is unable to reveal the true cost information;when the manufacturer offers a markdown money contract to the supplier with private cost information, and offers a wholesale price contract to the other supplier, it is able to reveal the true cost information, but can't realize channel coordination;when the manufacturer offers markdown money contracts to both the two suppliers, it is able to reveal the true cost information while ensuring the channel is coordinated.We find from the numerical study that when the manufacturer offers markdown money contracts to both the two suppliers, the channel profit increases, and the feasible region of private information becomes larger, but the manufacturer's profit may decrease.关键词
成本信息不对称/装配系统/批发价/补贴/协同Key words
asymmetric cost information/assembly system/wholesale price/markdown money/coordination分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
吕飞,马士华..供应商成本信息不对称下装配系统协同问题研究[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(2):57-67,11.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71602189,71072035) （71602189,71072035）
教育部人文社科研究青年基金(16YJC630083) （16YJC630083）
