系统管理学报2017，Vol.26Issue(2)：319-325,7.
排污权交易条件下的跨界污染控制微分博弈分析
A Differential Game for Transboundary Pollution Control under Emission Permits Trading
摘要
Abstract
In this paper,we establish a differential game model between two adjacent regions for transboundary pollution control under emission permits trading.The objective is to use the optimal control theory to find the two regions' non-cooperative and cooperative optimal emission paths such that the regions' discounted stream of welfare is maximized.Moreover,we design a mechanism for allocating over time the individual's total welfare such that each region's instantaneous welfare under cooperation is higher than his non-cooperative welfare at any instant of time.关键词
跨界污染/微分博弈/排污权交易/污染控制Key words
transboundary pollution/differential game/emissions permits trading/pollution control分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
刘升学,易永锡,李寿德..排污权交易条件下的跨界污染控制微分博弈分析[J].系统管理学报,2017,26(2):319-325,7.基金项目
湖南省哲学社会科学基金资助项目(16YBA315,13YBB195) （16YBA315,13YBB195）
湖南省教育厅科技重点项目(13A084) （13A084）
国家社会科学基金青年项目(15CJY037) （15CJY037）
