经济数学2017，Vol.34Issue(1)：72-76,5.
主体异质性下风险联合投资演化博弈模型研究
The Evolutionary Game Model of Syndication in Venture Capital under Agent Heterogeneity
摘要
Abstract
On the basis of this previous studies,this paper set up an evolutionary game of venture capital syndication by taking into account the following two main factors: agent heterogeneity and benefit-to-cost ratio, solved evolutionary stable strategy,and analyzed how the relevant factors affected the evolutionary stable strategy.It points out that the strategy choice of corporation will depend on the probability of the other corporation' Nash equilibrium strategy, but syndicated cooperative behavior will eventually terminate because of one corporation'breaking down the contract.Agent heterogeneity and benefit-to-cost ratio affect the two parties' cooperative behavior.If agent heterogeneity increases, and benefit-to-cost ratio decreases, the probability of syndication success increases accordingly.The syndicated cooperative behavior will steadily maintain for a long time because the two game parties abide by contracts.关键词
博弈论/风险投资/联合投资/主体异质性/演化博弈Key words
game theory/venture capital/syndication/agent heterogeneity/evolutionary game分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
王宁,白静,张新立..主体异质性下风险联合投资演化博弈模型研究[J].经济数学,2017,34(1):72-76,5.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目(71603245) （71603245）
