经济与管理研究2017，Vol.38Issue(5)：125-133,9.DOI:10.13502/j.cnki.issn1000-7636.2017.05.013
控股股东代理问题、现金股利与权益资本成本
Agency Problem of Controlling Shareholder,Cash Dividends and Cost of Equity Capital
摘要
Abstract
Based on the perspective of agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders,this paper investigates the influence of companies` cash dividend distribution on the cost of equity capital,and discusses the effects on companies under different characteristics of controlling shareholders.Using a sample of Chinese listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2006 to 2011,the empirical results show that cash dividend distribution may decline the cost of equity capital.Moreover,such weakening effect is stronger when the controlling shareholder is non-state-controlled or in the companies with the separation of control rights and cash flow rights.The study indicates that cash dividends can be used as an effective internal governance mechanism to alleviate the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders,which will result in a decline of the cost of equity capital.关键词
控股股东/代理问题/现金股利/权益资本成本Key words
controlling shareholder/agency problem/cash dividend/cost of equity capital分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
罗琦,彭梓倩,吴哲栋..控股股东代理问题、现金股利与权益资本成本[J].经济与管理研究,2017,38(5):125-133,9.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目"基于控股股东市场择时动机的公司投融资行为研究"(71272230) （71272230）
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划"中国上市公司权益资本成本研究"(NCET-13-0437) （NCET-13-0437）
国家社会科学基金项目"我国上市公司股利决策与投资效率研究"(14BGL043) （14BGL043）
