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面向电动汽车产业发展的政企合作博弈研究

陈翌 尤建新 薛奕曦 孔德洋

同济大学学报(自然科学版)2017,Vol.45Issue(3):440-446,7.
同济大学学报(自然科学版)2017,Vol.45Issue(3):440-446,7.DOI:10.11908/j.issn.0253-374x.2017.03.020

面向电动汽车产业发展的政企合作博弈研究

Cooperative Game Between Electric Vehicles Manufacturers and Government for Electric Vehicles Industry Development

陈翌 1尤建新 2薛奕曦 1孔德洋3

作者信息

  • 1. 同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092
  • 2. 同济大学汽车学院,上海200092
  • 3. 上海大学管理学院,上海200444
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

Regarding to the validity of financial subsidy policy about electric vehicles (EVs),game theory is adopted to establish the pricing-decision models of EV manufacturers under the conditions of with and without subsidy,respectively.The variable of consumers' purchase decision behavior about EVs and conventional vehicles is introduced in the decision models so as to analyze the pricing decisions of EV manufacturers and the profit function in different situations.The results show that the optimal pricing about EVs by manufacturers under the financial subsidy is,however,higher than that without subsidy because of the information asymmetry.To improve the effectiveness of subsidy polices,some recommendations about canceling the GSP of subsidy,exploring the sharing mechanism,changing the actors of receiving subsidy and strengthening supervision are proposed.

关键词

电动汽车/政府补贴/定价/合作博弈

Key words

electric vehicle/government subsidy/pricing decision/cooperative game

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

陈翌,尤建新,薛奕曦,孔德洋..面向电动汽车产业发展的政企合作博弈研究[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版),2017,45(3):440-446,7.

基金项目

“十二五”国家科技支撑计划(2015BAG11B01) (2015BAG11B01)

上海市自然科学基金(14JC1402204) (14JC1402204)

中国博士后面上基金(2015M581582) (2015M581582)

同济大学学报(自然科学版)

OA北大核心CSCDCSTPCD

0253-374X

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