运筹与管理2017，Vol.26Issue(4)：1-11,11.DOI:10.12005/orms.2017.0076
考虑违约风险时收益共享-贸易信贷契约下多个竞争零售商的供应链协调
Revenue-sharing Trade Credit Contract for Coordinating Multiple Competing Retailers When Incorporating Default Risk
摘要
Abstract
We consider a supply chain with a supplier and multiple competing retailers.We explore the issue of supply chain coordination by considering trade credit,its risk and competition among retailers.It shows that when allocating demand among the retailers proportional to their order quantities,there exists a unique Nash equilibrium order quantity which increases in default risk and the number of retailers respectively;and trade credit fails to coordinate the supply chain when competition is weak.In order to coordinate the supply chain,we assume that supplier grants trade credit and revenue sharing.Then,we analytically examine the impacts of retailer's default risk and competition among retailers on coordinating contract parameters.Our results show that supplier's wholesale price and risk premium increase in default,but the revenue-sharing ratio that is allocated to retailers decreases in it;supplier's wholesale price and risk premium increase in the number of retailers,but the revenue-sharing ratio decreases in it.Further more,we show that when the retailers' default risk is higher and the competition among retailers is more intensive,it is worse to the retailers but is better to the supplier.Finally,we demonstrate the theoretical results of the proposed model through a numerical example.关键词
供应链协调/违约风险/竞争性/收益共享/贸易信贷Key words
supply chain coordination/default risk/competition/revenue sharing/trade credit分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
王明征,周亮,刘伟伟..考虑违约风险时收益共享-贸易信贷契约下多个竞争零售商的供应链协调[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(4):1-11,11.基金项目
国家自然科学基金(71671023,71171027,71431002) （71671023,71171027,71431002）
国家自然科学基金创新研究群体基金(71421001)以及中央高校基本科研业务经费(DUT15YQ102)的支持 （71421001）
