标准科学Issue(5)：33-37,54,6.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1674-5698.2017.05.005
团体标准协调机理研究:一个动态分析
Dynamic Analysis on the Coordination Mechanism of Group Standards
摘要
Abstract
On the standard economics attribute, group standard is a kind of standard between the fact and the formal standard. How to coordinate the selection between the facts and the formal standards is the key to the efficiency at the micro level of the group standards. Based on the classic double game model "prisoner's dilemma", this paper constructs the three-stage coordination game model to analyze the coordination between the group standard and the formal standard in the process of evolution. Research shows that under the premise of knowing the future formal standard (i.e. standard group) is better than the fact standard and the performance standard is higher than the formal de facto standard, low discount and lack of patience among the participators can facilitate the "cooperation" as soon as possible. Finally, based on the actual condition it gives the policy recommendations to improve the standard group revenue, speed up the update rate of the standard versions and pay attention to the "small" enterprises.关键词
团体标准/动态博弈/协调机理Key words
group standard/dynamic game/coordination mechanism引用本文复制引用
王宇..团体标准协调机理研究:一个动态分析[J].标准科学,2017,(5):33-37,54,6.基金项目
本文受国家社科基金年度一般项目(项目编号:15BJY002)资助. （项目编号:15BJY002）
