中国人口·资源与环境2017，Vol.27Issue(5)：17-26,10.DOI:10.12062/cpre.20170332
农村水环境治理行动的演化博弈分析
Evolutionary game analysis on rural water environmental governance
摘要
Abstract
As the economy enters a'new normal',China'environment has reached the upper limit of the carrying capacity,and the rural water environment also has the problems of'while pollution while treatment'and local government supervision fatigue.The basic reason is the lack of rural water environment governance endogenous mechanism.When the central government has invested a lot of energy and financial resources,other stakeholders have different interest demands and oriented behavior conflicts.Therefore,to clarify the relationship among the main bodies of rural water environmental governance will help to break through this dilemma and then form into better action mechanism.The evolution process of governance in the rural water environment within the tripartite game subjects of local governments,companies and farmers is analyzed based on an evolutionary game model.The results show that the system evolves with a multi-repetitive complex scene.Under the favorable situation,as long as the farmers are willing to participate in governance,local governments will eventually tend to play guiding roles,and companies will also choose purifying strategy,then the whole system will evolve to better state,and rural water environmental quality will be significantly improved.Conversely,in the worse scenario,even if farmers are willing to participate,or companies willing to take the purification strategies,but the local government still won't support or other participants won't cooperate together,then the system will be locked and turned into the bad state,resulting in'the public tragedy'of rural water environmental governance.Under the general situation,it shows that by adjusting the value of parameters of strategies of all parties,as long as local governments and companies are committed to implement a series of guidance and support strategies to protect farmers to get benefits from the participation of rural water environmental governance,the system will get rid of the bad state,and then it will form a good situation of tripartite co-governance.On these basis,a case of rural water environment treatment action is analyzed,to further validate that as long as the government and companies take the protection of farmers'interests with joint action,the rural water environment quality would be improved.Finally,the countermeasures and suggestions to promote the participation of the three parties,and to protect the interests of farmers in rural water environmental management action are proposed.关键词
农村水环境治理/演化博弈/三方主体Key words
rural water environmental governance/evolutionary game/tripartite subjects分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
许玲燕,杜建国,汪文丽..农村水环境治理行动的演化博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(5):17-26,10.基金项目
江苏省教育厅人文社会科学研究基金“江苏省农村水环境承载力情景模拟及提升策略研究”(批准号:2016SJB630091) （批准号:2016SJB630091）
江苏省博士后项目“太湖流域农村水环境承载力演化分析及提升策略研究”(批准号:1501074C) （批准号:1501074C）
国家自然科学基金面上项目“名牌产品供应链不良环境行为:形成、演化及治理策略研究”(批准号:71471076) （批准号:71471076）
中国国家自然科学基金委员会与韩国国家研究基金委国际合作项目“FDI企业环境创新行为及环境绩效研究——以在华韩资企业为例”(批准号:71411170250) （批准号:71411170250）
江苏大学高级人才启动项目“基于农民专业合作社的干旱指数巨灾期权运作机制设计与制度安排”(批准号:14JDG103). （批准号:14JDG103）
