运筹与管理2017，Vol.26Issue(6)：81-88,8.DOI:10.12005/orms.2017.0140
批发价格与收益共享合约并存下的供应链信息泄露研究
Information Leakage in Supply Chain with Co-existence of Wholesale Price Contract and Revenue Sharing Contract
摘要
Abstract
Information leakage is one of the barriers to information sharing among supply chain members.In this paper,we study information leakage issue within an upstream supplier and two competing downstream retailersthe incumbent and the entrant.Considering the long-term cooperative relationship between the supplier and the incumbent,we assume they are linked by a revenue sharing contract.Since the entrant just enters the market,the supplier offers him a wholesale price contract.By using signaling game framework,we analyze the pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this setting,and provide the conditions for separating equilibrium,pooling equilibrium and non-leakage equilibrium.The study finds that the supplier has incentive to withhold the information from the incumbent if the revenue sharing rate and the wholesale price satisfy certain condition.Finally,we compare the incumbent,the entrant and the supplier's equilibrium profits in separating and non-leakage equilibrium via numerical examples.关键词
信息泄露/供应链/批发价格合约/收益共享合约Key words
information leakage/supply chain/wholesale price contract/revenue sharing contract分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
夏海洋..批发价格与收益共享合约并存下的供应链信息泄露研究[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(6):81-88,8.基金项目
项目资助:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71202052,71471062,71573087,71431004,71473085) （71202052,71471062,71573087,71431004,71473085）
教育部人文社会科学研究规划青年基金资助项目(12YJC630240) （12YJC630240）
中央高校基本科研业务费基金 （）
