管理工程学报2017，Vol.31Issue(4)：156-163,8.DOI:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2017.04.020
随机产出与随机需求下TPL介入的农产品供应链协调
Coordination of agri-products supply chain with TPL's participation under random yield and random demand
摘要
Abstract
We consider a three-echelon agri-products supply chain composed of a supplier,a third-party logistics (TPL) provider and a retailer,in which the supplier produces agri-products,through the TPL provider,to a terminal market where the retailer purchases and sells them to end customers.The yield of the supplier and the market demand which is sensitive to the logistics service level are both random.We set up a sequential non-cooperative game model where the supplier acts as a strong-leader and the TPL provider acts as a weak-leader.Then,we study the optimal ordering quantity,logistics service level and planning input quantity decisions under the centralized decision-making mode and the sequential non-cooperative game mode,respectively.We find that the optimal decisions of members in the two modes both exist.The ratio between the retailer's optimal ordering quantity and the TPL provider's optimal logistics service level is lower than the corresponding result under the centralized decision-making mode while the supplier's planning fill rates are equal under the both modes.Thus,the expected profit is distorted under the sequential non-cooperative game mode.interestingly,the optimal ordering quantity,logistics service level and planning input quantity of the sequential non-cooperative game mode are less than the corresponding results of the centralized decision-making mode when the basis market demand subjects to uniform distribution and the marginal profit of the retailer is not less than that of the TPL provider.To coordinate this three-echelon supply chain,we introduce a wholesale-market clearance contract between the supplier and the retailer and a transport-market clearance contract between the TPL provider and the retailer sequentially,which is based on the principle of risk-sharing and profit-sharing.As these contracts lead the members' expected profit function to be mapping functions of the supply chain expected profit function under centralized decision-making mode,the optimal ordering quantity,logistics service level and planning input quantity under the coordination mode with the two contracts are equal to that under centralized decision-making mode.Apparently,the supply chain is coordinated perfectly.Subsequently,we prove that this chain can realize the Pareto improvement when contract parameters satisfy certain conditions.Finally,a numerical example is given.Firstly,we compare the results between the sequential non-cooperative game mode and centralized decision-making mode,which verifies profit loss in the sequential non-cooperative game mode.In addition,the sensitivity analysis of contracts parameter α and β to the wholesale price and the logistics service price is conducted,respectively,under the coordination mode,which demonstrates the wholesale price decreases with α,while the logistics service price increases with it.For β,the wholesale price is not relevant with it,while the logistics service price decreases with it.Furthermore,we do the sensitivity analysis of supplier's external purchase cost,which implies that the expected profits of all members and the supplier's planning fill rate increase with the increase of supplier's external purchase cost.关键词
随机产出/随机需求/TPL服务商/序贯非合作博弈/农产品供应链协调Key words
Random yield/Random demand/TPL provider/Sequential non-cooperative game/Agri-products supply chain coordination分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
冯颖,余云龙,张炎治,吴茜..随机产出与随机需求下TPL介入的农产品供应链协调[J].管理工程学报,2017,31(4):156-163,8.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101147) （71101147）
中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(20110491477) （20110491477）
江苏省博士后科研基金资助计划(1101111C) （1101111C）
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2013W12) （2013W12）
