系统管理学报2017，Vol.26Issue(5)：933-940,8.
基于跨期排污权交易的最优环境监管策略
The Optimal Supervision Mechanism Based on Inter-temporal Emission Trading
摘要
Abstract
Government regulation is one of the key factors in emissions trading.By building a continuous dynamic model,this article discusses the optimal environmental regulation of government policy under the condition of inter-temporal emissions trading,and further discusses the factors that affect the government regulatory strategy choice.The results show that when firm refuses to choose illegal discharge,the government should set the supervision level at a minimum level,and the supervision level is influence by the rate of time preference,sewage,tax and subsidy factors.For instance,when polluters pay more attention to the current cost,the government's optimal level of regulation will increase first and then keep fixed over time.When polluters pay more attention to long-term costs,the government's optimal level of regulation will decrease first and then increase over time;The higher the pollution tax and subsidy level,the higher the optimal supervision level.When firm decides to accept illegal discharge,relying only on the government's regulation cannot force corporate law-abiding drainage,in fact,the government needs to determine a suitable illegal dredge penalties combined with regulation,and select inter-temporal trading hours at the place of illegal dredge turning point.At this point,the optimal level of regulation is not only influenced by the level of pollution taxes and subsidies,but also by illegal dredge penalties and government unit cost.关键词
排污权交易/政府监管/惩罚机制Key words
emission trading/government supervision/punishment mechanism分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
李冬冬,杨晶玉..基于跨期排污权交易的最优环境监管策略[J].系统管理学报,2017,26(5):933-940,8.基金项目
《胶州市排污权有偿使用和交易机制设计研究》(2014S060) （2014S060）
