中国人口·资源与环境2017，Vol.27Issue(9)：56-65,10.DOI:10.12062/cpre.20170518
基于集体行动逻辑的京津冀雾霾合作治理演化博弈分析
Evolutionary game analysis on cooperative governance of haze in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei based on the logic of collective action
摘要
Abstract
At present,Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei is facing the plight of environmental externalities and collective action on the haze control problem.The root of the problem lies in the fact that as a member of the haze cooperative governance,the benefit of local government is asymmetrical.Fragmented the link between benefits and losses of collection action to correct the environmental externality is a kind of market failure replaced by government failure.The logic of Olsen's collective action is manifested as a dynamic repetitive game of private rationality and collective rationality in the implementation of the haze cooperative governance in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei.In view of the collective action of air pollution joint control in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei,this paper constructs stag hunt model to study government's implementation strategy of haze cooperation governance by means of evolutionary research tools.The game process is divided into evolutionary,stochastic and dynamic three stages,which explores the behavioral characteristics and influencing factors of local governments in collective action of Haze control.According to the replicator of dynamic equation,the evolution of participant's behavior and evolutionary stable strategy are discussed.The numerical simulation method is used to analyze the evolutionary trends and evolution equilibrium of the system under different situations.Model estimates indicate that the evolutionary equilibrium state of the system influenced by stochastic factors and the dynamic equilibrium mechanism achieve the multiregional environmental cooperation alliance.A general finding is that the dynamic evolution of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei in the implementation of haze cooperative governance is largely dependent on the ratio of free rid income to collective action income and the environmental preference coefficient of the district in the region as a whole.Therefore,it is necessary for central government to improve the cross-regional environmental law system,establish a consistent regional environmental quality standard,and reduce the gain of local government's free ride.More importandy,the coercive and selective incentives thatconstrain local government to take responsibility of environmental governance should be determined in the form of legislation.In addition,the economic losses caused by haze should be bringing into the local officials' performance appraisal system.The central government should strengthen the supervision when local governments conductair pollution control in order to achievethe Pareto improvement of collective action during the course of haze cooperative governance.关键词
集体行动/演化博弈/猎鹿模型/数值仿真Key words
collective action/evolutionary game/stag hunt model/numerical simulation分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
初钊鹏,刘昌新,朱婧..基于集体行动逻辑的京津冀雾霾合作治理演化博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(9):56-65,10.基金项目
国家社会科学基金项目“空间正义视阈下京津冀协同发展的城市群治理研究”(批准号:17BJY054) （批准号:17BJY054）
河北省自然科学基金项目“基于情景分析的河北省碳减排环境效应与碳市场路径研究”(批准号:D2016501095). （批准号:D2016501095）
