中国人口·资源与环境2017，Vol.27Issue(9)：83-92,10.DOI:10.12062/cpre.20170428
加大行政奖惩力度是中国环境绩效改善的主要原因吗?
Is stronger punishment and reward system the main reason for improving environment performance in China?
摘要
Abstract
During the 11 th and 12th FiveYear Plan periods (FYP),China's emission reduction indexes,such as per unit GDP energy consumption,sulfur dioxide (SO2) and chemical oxygen demand (COD) emissions,have all reached the expected targets,posing a sharp contrast with the failures of those goals in the 10th FYP.Current studies have the inconformity for the explanation of such phenomenon at both macro and micro levels.Major reason for such difference maybe the fact that current research tends to attribute the improvement on environment governance solely to the impact of formal institutions but ignores the positive effects resulting from informal institutions.This paper conducts an empirical research from frame of principal-agent model which contains both formal and informal incentives,to test our argument.Hinged on the data of 717 questionnaires from government officials at different levels and tested with structural equation model (SEM),this study shows that the 11 incentives created by formal institutions have no significant influence on officials' environmental governance performance.Obedience to the central government's guidance and superior officials' attention,those incentives from informal institutions,are found to have significant impacts on the improvement.There are two approaches for informal institution to exert its impacts on environmental governance.In the first approach,the feeling of pressure among local officials becomes a mediator variable between informal institutions and officials' environmental governance performance.Officials' promotion preference and obedience preference are positive adjustment variables,where the strictness of implementing formal rulesis a negative adjustment variable.The effect of informal institutions increases as officials have stronger promotion preference and the strictness of formal incentives implementation declines.The mediate effect of pressure is positively influenced by officers' obedience preference.In the second pathway,informal institution could also affect environmental performance directly and is adjusted by officers' service preference.Stronger such preference to be,more influential of informal incentives would be.These findings help us to renew our theoretical knowledge of China's policy implementation and government official incentives by explaining the previous theoretical paradox and providing empirical evidence of how China's pressure-driven system operates.关键词
五年规划/官员激励/环境治理/非正式制度Key words
Five Year Plan/government official incentives/environmental governance/informal system分类
资源环境引用本文复制引用
唐啸,周绍杰,刘源浩,胡鞍钢..加大行政奖惩力度是中国环境绩效改善的主要原因吗?[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(9):83-92,10.基金项目
国家社会科学基金项目“中国特色水权市场制度体系研究”(批准号:15ZDB164) （批准号:15ZDB164）
中国博士后科学基金项目“官员知识供给对环境政策执行影响机制研究”(批准号:2016M600103). （批准号:2016M600103）
