中国人口·资源与环境2017，Vol.27Issue(10)：19-29,11.DOI:10.12062/cpre.20170450
央地分权下地区环境污染的空间效应分析
Spatial effect of regional environmental pollution under the central-local decentralization
摘要
Abstract
In recent years,the central government has successively put forward laws,regulations and documents on environmental protection while local governments have also increased their investment of environmental governance.However,the emission of industrial pollution in China doesn't decrease.It even goes up.It seems that the phenomenon of'green paradox'has shown up-the more intensified the regulations are,the more serious environmental pollution will be.In this paper,the author started with the angle of 'power separation between the central and local governments',chose data from 2003 to 2014 in 76 prefecture-level cities in six provinces in the middle and lower reaches of Yangtze River,analyzed spatial effects of power separation between the central and local governments and environmental regulations of environmental pollution and discussed whether competition of the local governments would deepen the effects so as to elaborate on partial mechanism of the'green paradox'in China.According to calculation of the Moran I index,the author found out that there was a positive spatial correlation between industrial pollution emission in the sample area and local governmental competition,which showed that both environmental pollution emission and local governmental competition had the feature of'partial agglomeration'.The SDM estimation displayed that,more intensified power separation of the central and local governments in neighboring regions would result in more environmental pollution emission;the local environmental regulations had some restrictive effects on the local environmental pollution emission but upgraded environmental regulations in neighboring regions would increase the local pollution emission.Competition between local governments weaken the restrictive effect of environmental regulations in local and neighboring regions on local environmental pollution,which explains the existence of the'green paradox'.Due to financial power separation of central and local governments,the local governments lower standards of environmental regulations in the regions so as to take care of the local companies and attract transformation of companies in neighboring regions.Thus,the standard of local environmental regulations is lowered and the'bottom competition'of environmental regulation between governments is formed.Finally,the environmental pollution gets worse,which is out of people's expectation.Therefore,in order to avoid'bottom competition'of environmental regulations between governments,the governments should amend and improve the check-up system of local government officials,integrate the two evaluation systems of the superior government and the people,intensify local environmental cooperation,avoid blind competition,further specify local financial rights,guarantee input proportion in fiscal expenditure and enhance social technological innovation.关键词
央地分权/环境规制/环境污染/地方政府竞争/空间效应Key words
central-local decentralization/environmental regulation/environmental pollution/local government competition/spatial effect分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
游达明,张杨..央地分权下地区环境污染的空间效应分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(10):19-29,11.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助项目“环境规制与企业生态技术创新激励:基于央地分权视角的理论与实证研究”(批准号:71573283). （批准号:71573283）
