环境保护科学2017，Vol.43Issue(4)：55-61,7.DOI:10.16803/j.cnki.issn.1004-6216.2017.04.011
氮氧化物减排博弈行为研究
Research of the Game Behavior of Emission Reduction of Nitrogen Oxides
摘要
Abstract
In this paper,with regard to the severe situation of emission reduction of nitrogen oxides in China,by reference to the Swedish tax refund system,evolutionary game theory and method is used to establish an evolutionary game model of emission reduction of nitrogen oxides between government and enterprise,and solution analysis is performed.The results show that the strategy (emission reduction,tax refund system) and the strategy (emission reduction,standard emission reduction system) are both stable equilibrium strategies.That is,whether the government takes tax refund system or standard emission reduction system,as long as the penalty coefficient,tax rate and other parameters can be adjusted,enterprises could be forced to reduce emission of nitrogen oxides.However,the simulation results indicate that the tax return system has a greater incentive to the enterprises,which can promote enterprises to reduce emission of nitrogen oxides for long.关键词
税收返还制度/标准减排制度/氮氧化物减排/进化博弈Key words
Tax Refund System/Standard Emission Reduction System/Emission Reduction of Nitrogen Oxides/Evolutionary Game分类
资源环境引用本文复制引用
黄少薇,张骥骧..氮氧化物减排博弈行为研究[J].环境保护科学,2017,43(4):55-61,7.基金项目
国家自然科学基金(71101071) （71101071）
中国博士后科学基金(2013M530089) （2013M530089）
南航大基本科研业务费科研项目(NR2015025)基金资助 （NR2015025）
