标准科学Issue(11)：95-101,7.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1674-5698.2017.11.019
食品安全事件公开报道合谋问题的演化博弈分析
Analysis on the Evolutionary Game of the Collusion of Food Safety Incident Public Report
摘要
Abstract
With the information asymmetry of food safety, the collusion between food companies and media influences the spread of food safety information, increasing the defensive spending and risk cost of consumers, reducing the efficiency of resource allocation. According to the conspired problem of food safety reporting, this paper explores the causes of conspiracy between food companies and media, by building an evolutionary game model of the food industry, media, and regulators under the hypothesis of bounded rationality. It proposes the effective countermeasures to the conspiracy between food enterprises and media, which includes establishing compensation mechanism for traceability, perfecting the mechanism of rewards and punishments for food companies, developing the food industry exit mechanism, establishing media rights list and responsibilities list, realizing technical flow through various channels to liquidate, establishing attractive incentive mechanism and further reducing administrative costs.关键词
食品安全/媒体报道/演化博弈/合谋Key words
food safety/media report/evolutionary game/collusion引用本文复制引用
景娜,张月义..食品安全事件公开报道合谋问题的演化博弈分析[J].标准科学,2017,(11):95-101,7.基金项目
本文受浙江省自然科学基金"食品安全公共治理研究-信息不对称视角"(项目编号:LY17G030028)资助. （项目编号:LY17G030028）
