运筹与管理2017，Vol.26Issue(12)：17-22,45,7.DOI:10.12005/orms.2017.0281
阈值风险下的多企业合作治理污染的演化博弈分析
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Enterprises Cooperative Reducing Emissions with Collective Risk
摘要
Abstract
Environmental pollution has significant cross-regional characteristics , and environmental resources have the characteristics of public goods .It is difficult to achieve effective results in the treatment of pollutants by single pollution-producing enterprises .Multi-enterprise cooperation within the same jurisdiction is the only way for environmental protection .This paper researches on the evolutionary process of decision among multiple enter-prises from the perspective of evolutionary game theory .The evolutionary game model between multi-enterprises governments is established .Considering environmental degradation risk brought by total emissions more than the capacity threshold , we focus on the effect of risk on the emergence of cooperation to reduce emissions among enterprises.The results show that higher governance cost strongly constraints the behavior choice of profit -seeking enterprises to governance pollution , causing social dilemma-the tragedy of the commons .Based on higher govern-ance cost , we find that the dilemma is relieved in high-risk situations where cooperation is likely to persist and dominate defection .Large initial endowment and emissions charges to enterprises can effectively promote the enterprise to control the pollutant discharging , in order to protect their private endowment .Finally, some policy suggestions for the implementation of environmental regulation are proposed .关键词
合作治理/演化博弈/演化稳定策略/公共物品博弈Key words
cooperative governance/evolutionary game/evolutionary stable strategy/public goods games分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
王先甲,何奇龙,全吉..阈值风险下的多企业合作治理污染的演化博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(12):17-22,45,7.基金项目
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71231007) （71231007）
青年科学基金项目"复杂工程中不完全信息多议题争端谈判的博弈模型与合作机制研究"(71501149) （71501149）
