运筹与管理2017，Vol.26Issue(12)：104-111,8.DOI:10.12005/orms.2017.0292
重复采购竞拍中两种卡特尔串谋机制稳定性的边界条件研究
Research on Stability Boundary of Two Cartel Collusion Mechanism in Repeated Procurement Auction
摘要
Abstract
We further study critical discount and reserve price ' s effects on the stability of two cartel collusion mechanisms ( strong cartel and weak cartel ) in repeated procurement auctions .We draw two conclusions: ( 1 ) when collusive member's discount is larger than critical discount , no members will betray the collusion agree-ment, or else collusion will collapse;(2) compared with simple reserve price and Nash reserve price , the mini-mal deterrent reserve price is the most effective reserve price to deter collusion and earn certain profit .The research results help to enhance the understanding of two kinds of operation mechanism of the cartel collusion mechanism in repeated purchase auction , and enrich the theory research of supervision mechanism and strategies of collusion in repeated purchasing environment .关键词
重复采购竞拍/卡特尔/价格串谋/串谋稳定性/最小保留价格Key words
repeated procurement auction/strong/weak cartel/price collusion/the stability of collusion/the smallest reserve price分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
林菡密,孙绍荣..重复采购竞拍中两种卡特尔串谋机制稳定性的边界条件研究[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(12):104-111,8.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目(70871080,71171134) （70871080,71171134）
上海市教委科研创新重点项目(11ZS138) （11ZS138）
上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2011BGL006) （2011BGL006）
上海市一流学科建设项目(S1201YLXK) （S1201YLXK）
