运筹与管理2018，Vol.27Issue(2)：178-185,8.DOI:10.12005/orms.2018.0050
创业企业控制权模式选择研究
Research on Optimal Model of Control Right of Venture Enterprises
摘要
Abstract
It is a common phenomenon that entrepreneur and venture capitalists have conflict with control rights. In order to solve this problem,in this paper,we analyze the control mode between entrepreneurs and venture cap-italists and the process of the strategies they select in controlling the game,and by applying the method of repli-cator dynamics,we find that:(1)the result is that joint control or camera control is stable strategy when entre-preneurs and venture capitalists choose whether to fight for control.(2)when the successful probability of the project,and residual claims the venture capitalist to obtain increase,they converge in the control,whereas they decrease,they converge in the camera control;when the probability of success of the project is more than 50%, the reduction in the fixed income converge in the joint control,start-up enterprises' increased output converges in the joint control,and if not,it converges in the camera control.Finally,the model conclusions are tested by the CV Source database sample data,and the results are in agreement with the main conclusions of the theoreti-cal model.The conclusion is of certain practical significance for guiding the rational choice of the mode of control right of the enterprise in China.关键词
控制权/演化博弈/模式/选择Key words
control rights/evolutionary game/model choice分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
陈涛,党兴华,贾窦洁..创业企业控制权模式选择研究[J].运筹与管理,2018,27(2):178-185,8.基金项目
教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20106108110012) （20106108110012）
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172201) （71172201）
陕西省软科学计划资助项目(2011KRZ08) （2011KRZ08）
