运筹与管理2017，Vol.26Issue(11)：182-189,8.DOI:10.12005/orms.2017.0277
管理者过度自信行为下煤矿安全监管机制设计研究
Mechanism Design for Coalmine Safety Management with Overconfident Manager
摘要
Abstract
For the status of China's coalmine safety supervision and the coalmine manager's overconfidence behavior,the two-stage multitask principal-agent model consisting of government,coalmine enterprise and overconfident manager is constructed,and the impact of the manager's overconfidence level on its own safety supervision effort,the coalmine enterprise's incentive coefficient,the government's rewards and punishment coefficient and the government's safety performance is analyzed.The results are further compared to the completely rational scenario.It is found that,as the manager's overconfidence level increases,the manager's safety supervision effort level,the rewards and punishment coefficient,and the corresponding safety work performance deviate far away from the rational scenario.Finally a numerical example is provided to demonstrate the validity of the proposed model and results,which finds an appropriate decision support for the coalmine safety supervision and practice.关键词
煤矿企业/安全监管/机制设计/过度自信/双重委托代理理论Key words
coalmine enterprise/safety supervision/mechanism design/overconfidence/double principal-agent theory分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
陈克贵,王新宇,宋学锋,张明慧..管理者过度自信行为下煤矿安全监管机制设计研究[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(11):182-189,8.基金项目
国家重点研发计划项目(2017YFC0804408) （2017YFC0804408）
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71173216) （71173216）
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(17YJC630012) （17YJC630012）
江苏省社会科学基金项目研究成果(15JD038) （15JD038）
中国博士后科研基金资助项目(2015M570492) （2015M570492）
